History of the U.S. Intelligence
The US invested heavily in developing the intelligence system during the Second World War. The government established agencies and put in place legislation, tools, and other support system to help the agencies gather information. Although this was the case, the government seems not to have placed enough measures to help it in analyzing the gathered information. Shortly after the government had created an intelligence agency, foreign forces attacked it, proving the system weak and wanting. This happened when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, in 1941. The congressional hearings during 1970s revealed a flaw in the manner through which intelligence agencies collected information. The September 11 attacks in 2001 happened when the country’s intelligence agency was well developed in terms of experience and technology used. Yet despite the growth, the country ended up facing one of the worst attacks in history. These incidents demonstrate a gap in the country’s intelligence agency. It is clear that although the country has adequate intelligence gathering tools, it lacks the same mechanisms in analyzing and interpreting this intelligence for its own benefit.
Although the US was late in establishing ways of gathering information, it has developed quickly in this area. This is due to its massive investment. However, the country continues to lack analytical tools, which in turn has lessened the effectiveness of the intelligence community in the country. In some cases, the Oval Office and the bureaucratic system limits the intelligence community’s ability to perform its duties. In other cases, the different intelligent agencies do not share information, and this enhances the problem. The 9/11 commission recommended that the intelligence community should have one national director, who would streamline intelligence gathering. Investing in better analytical tools will ensure that the intelligence community reduces some of the mistakes made in the past.
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