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Ford’s Revitalization Strategy

Case 4 Ford and the World Automobile Industry Robert M. Grant FORD? ’S REVITALIZATION STRATEGY In September 2003, Bruce Blythe took up the new position as chief strategy officer at Ford Motor Company. His appointment came in the wake of a massive upheaval of Ford? ’s strategy, leadership, and organization. In 2001, Ford? ’s CEO Jacques Nasser had been ousted by the board after a three-year tenure. Nasser? ’s goal had been to transform Ford into a flexible, customer-focused, innovative, global giant? —that simultaneously paid careful attention to profitability and shareholder return.

By late 2001, it was clear that the strategy was not working. Overpriced acquisitions had dissipated shareholder value, the Firestone-Ford Explorer recall severely dented Ford? ’s reputation with consumers, and Ford was heading for its biggest loss ever. Company chairman, Bill Ford, assumed executive control of the company his great-grandfather had created. In January 2002, Bill Ford announced a new strategic direction for the company. Cost cutting would eliminate 35,000 jobs worldwide, close of five plants in North America, divest $1 billion of non-core assets, and take $2 billion out of operating costs in the first year.

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At the same time, Ford would invest heavily in new models? —between 2002 and 2006, $20 billion would be spent on a new product development program that would introduce 20 new or upgraded models to the US market every year. Particular emphasis was to be placed on the Premier Automotive Group which comprised Ford? ’s up market brands including Aston Martin, Jaguar, Land Rover, Lincoln, and Volvo. By the beginning of 2004, the revitalization strategy was beginning to show results. During 2003, cost reductions totaled $3. 2 billion, as a result of which the company? ’s net income was $495 million? after heavy losses during the previous two years. Yet, despite these clear signs of turnaround, Bruce Blythe was concerned over the outlook for the next five years. For all the improvements made in Ford? ’s core automotive business, cars and trucks were still losing a lot of money? —the automotive side made a pre-tax loss of $1,957 million in 2003, much bigger than the loss in 2002. Ford? ’s profits derived entirely from its financial services business, which produced a pre-tax profit of $3,327 in 2003. However, Blythe? ’s main concerns related to the future. During 2004, Ford? s capital expenditure would amount to $7 billion? —similar levels of capital expenditure were planned for subsequent years. Could these investments be justified by the returns that they were likely to generate? Much depended upon the state of the industry. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the performance of the world automobile industry had been dismal. During the 1990s, the industry had failed to cover its cost of capital? —all the world? ’s leading automobile manufacturers (with the exception of DaimlerChrysler) eared a negative Economic Value Added (see Table 4. ). And during 2000-03, industry profitability had deteriorated further. If Ford? ’s heavy investments in new products and plant flexibility were to yield the returns necessary to deliver on the commitments made by Bill Ford? ’s commitment to the superior shareholder returns then it was essential that the industry environment became more conducive to price stability and positive margins. As Blythe began examining the financial projections for 2004-06 made by CFO Allan Gilmour? ’s staff, his thoughts focused increasingly on the future of the automobile industry.

Would demand growth take up the excess capacity that has plagued the industry for most of the past six years, would mergers and acquisitions consolidate the industry to the point that destructive price competition could b consigned to history, and would consolidation both upstream (among components suppliers) and downstream (among dealers) mean that the auto manufacturers would constantly be squeezed from both ends? [Table 4. 1 about here] THE MARKET Trends in Market Demand During the 1880s, the first internal combustion powered vehicles were produced in Europe? notably by Gottllieb Daimler and Karl Benz in Germany. By the turn of the century hundred of small companies were producing automobiles both in Europe and in America. By 2004, the industry was in different stages of its life cycle in different parts of the world. The US industry entered a period of rapid growth during 1910-28, and reached its peak of production in 1965. In the two decades up to 2004, car production was on a downward trend, but if trucks were included, output was broadly stable (see table 4. 2).

In Europe and Japan too, total production was showing a declining trend The problem of market saturation was exacerbated by the tendency for cars to last longer(see table 4. 3). [Tables 4. 2 and 4. 3 about here] As a result, the automobile producers have looked increasingly to the newly industrializing countries for market opportunities. During the 1980s and 1990s countries such as Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Brazil, and Argentina offered the best growth prospects. As these markets became increasingly saturated, so China, India, and the former Soviet Union were seen as the ? next wave? ” of attractive markets. With the opening of many of these countries to trade and direct investment, the world production of cars and trucks s continued to grow (see table 4. 4 ). [Table 4. 4 about here] The Evolution of the Automobile The early years of the industry were characterized by considerable uncertainty over the design and technology of the motorcar. Early ? “horseless carriages? ” were precisely that ? – they followed design features of existing horse-drawn carriages and buggies. Early motorcars demonstrated a bewildering variety of technologies.

During the early years, the internal-combustion engine vied with the steam engine. Among internal-combustion engines there was a wide variety of cylinder configurations. Transmission systems, steering systems, and brakes all displayed a remarkable variety of technologies and designs, as well as considerable ingenuity. Over the years the technologies and designs of different manufactured parts tended to converge as many approaches (and their manufacturers) were eliminated through competition. The Ford Model T represented the first ? “dominant design? in automobiles ? – the technologies and design features of the Model T set a standard for other manufacturers to imitate. Convergence of technologies of designs was the dominant trend of the next ninety years. During the 1920s, all manufacturers adopted enclosed, all-steel bodies. During the last few decades of the 20th century most models with distinctively different designs disappeared: the VW Beetle with its rear, air-cooled engine, the Citroen 2-CV and its idiosyncratic braking and suspension system, Daft with its ? “Variomatic? transmission, and the distinctive models made by Eastern European manufacturers, such as the 3-cylinder Wartburg and the 2-cycle Trabant. Engines became more similar: typically 4 or 6 cylinders arranged in-line, with V-6 and V-8 configurations for larger cars. Front-wheel drive and disc, anti-lock brakes became standard on smaller cars; suspension and steering systems became more similar; body shapes became increasingly alike. Although the automobile continued to evolve, technological progress was incremental: innovations primarily involved new applications of electronics and new safety features.

A 1950 Mercedes had about 10 meters of wiring. A 1995 SL 500 with full options had 3,000 meters of wiring and 48 different microcomputers. In terms of automotive engineering the main advances were multi-valve cylinders, traction control systems, all-wheel drive, variable suspensions, and inter-cooled turbos. The quest for fuel economy resulted in the substitution of lighter materials (aluminum, plastics, ceramics, and composites) for iron and steel (see table 4. 5). Despite continuing advances in the application of electronics? including satellite navigation systems, communications technology (telematics), emergency signaling, collisionavoidance radar, and intelligent monitoring systems? —little in today? ’s family cars was radically new (see table 4. 6). [Tables 4. 5 and 4. 6 about here] Designs and technologies also converged among manufacturers. While different categories of vehicle (family cars, sports cars, passenger minivans, sport-utility vehicles) retained distinctive design features, within each manufacturers? ’ product offerings became increasingly similar. By 2000, GM was using wireless telephony-based ? vehicle locators? ” to help owners find their vehicles among the ranks of similar-looking cars. Convergence of technology and design meant a quest for new types of differentiation. All the major manufacturers developed new ? “concept cars,? ” and introduced novel design features. Many of the most innovative car designs–such Ford? ’s Ka, Toyota? ’s Yaris, and DaimlerChrysler? ’s Smart car– were targeted at the European small-car market:. Some manufacturers experimented with retro design features (e. g. , DaimlerChrysler? ’s PT Cruiser and the BMW Mini). Convergence also occurred across countries.

US cars downsized, Japanese and Italian cars became larger. The same market segments tended to emerge in different countries. The major differences between countries were in the sizes of the various segments. Thus, in the US, the ? “mid-size? ” family sedan was the largest segment, with the Ford Taurus, Honda Accord, and Toyota Camry the leading models. In Europe and Asia, small family cars (? “subcompacts? ”) formed the largest market segment. Other national differences were also apparent. In North America, pickup trucks, used as commercial vehicles in most of the world, increasingly displaced passenger cars.

The Evolution of Manufacturing Technology At the beginning of the twentieth century, car manufacture, like carriage-making, was a craft industry. Cars were built to order according to individual customers? ’ preferences and specifications. In Europe and North America there were hundreds of companies producing cars, few with annual production exceeding 1,000 vehicles. When Henry Ford began production in 1903, he used a similar approach. Even with fairly long runs of a single model (the first version of the Model T, for example), each car was individually built.

The development of more precise machine tools permitted interchangeable parts, which ushered in mass production: batch or continuous production of components which were then assembled on moving assembly lines by semi-skilled workers. The productivity gains were enormous. In 1912 it took 23 man-hours to assemble a Model T, just 14 months later it took only 4. The resulting fall in the price of cars opened up a new era of popular motoring. If ? “Fordism? ” was the first major revolution in process technology, then Toyota? ’s ? “lean production? ” was the second.

The system was developed by Toyota in post-war Japan at a time when shortages of key materials encouraged extreme parsimony and a need to avoid inventories and waste through defects. Key elements of the system were statistical process control, just-intime scheduling, quality circles, teamwork, and flexible production (more than one model manufactured on a single production line). Central to the new manufacturing was the transition from static concepts of efficiency optimization towards continuous improvement to which every employee contributed.

During the 1980s and 1990s all the world? ’s car manufacturers redesigned their manufacturing processes to incorporate variants of Toyota? ’s lean production. New manufacturing methods required heavy investments by the companies in both capital equipment and training. The 1980s were a period of unprecedented high investment expenditures. However, as GM was to learn after spending more than $10 billion in upgrading its plants, the essence of the Toyota system was not new manufacturing ? “hardware? ” in the form of robotics and computer-integrated manufacturing systems.

The critical elements were the ? “software? ” ? – new employee skills, new methods of shop-floor organization, redefined roles for managers, and new relationships with suppliers. The new flexible manufacturing technology together with modular designs reduced the extent of scale economies in assembly. During the 1960s and 1970s it was believed that efficiency required giant assembly plants with outputs of at least 400,000 units a year. During the past decade, most of the new plants established had output capacities of between 150,000 and 300,000 units.

The quest for flexibility was a central feature of Bill Ford? ’s revitalization strategy. Starting in Ford? ’s North American plants, reorganizing for flexibility would manufacturing multiple models in individual plants which would allow capacity totaling one million units to be closed. New Product Development The declining importance of scale economies in assembly did little to assist smaller automobile producers. The critical scale economy was the ability to amortize the huge costs of new product development over a large enough number of vehicles.

The cost of developing new model development had risen steeply as a result of increasing complexity of automobiles, the application of electronics and new materials, higher safety requirements, quality improvements, new environmental standards and the need for increased fuel efficiency. By the late 1980s the cost of creating an entirely new, mass-production passenger car from drawing board to production line was about $1. 25 billion. By the early 1990s, costs had escalated substantially above this level (see table 4. 7). [Table 4. about here] Smaller manufacturers could survive only by avoiding these massive product development costs. One way f was to avoid new model changes: at the time of its acquisition by Ford, Jaguar? ’s two models, the XJ-6 and XJ-S, were almost two decades old and almost no investment had been made in developing a new model. The tiny Morgan car company has made the same model since the late 1930s. The alternative was to license designs from larger manufacturers. Thus, Tofas of Turkey built Fiat-designed cars, Proton of Malaysia built Mitsubishi-designed cars, and Maruti of India produced Suzuki-designed cars.

The costs of new product development has been the major reason for the wave of mergers acquisitions in the industry Economies from sharing development costs also encouraged increased collaboration and joint ventures: Renault and Peugeot established joint engine manufacturing; GM established collaborations with Suzuki, Daewoo, Toyota, and Fiat to build cars and share components. In China and India most new auto plants were joint ventures between local and overseas companies. During the 1990s, new product development emerged as the critical organizational capability differentiating car manufacturers.

Designing, developing, and putting into production a completely new automobile was hugely complex process involving every function of the firm, up to 3,000 engineers, close collaboration with several hundred suppliers, and up to five years from drawing board to market launch. By 2004, the leading Japanese manufacturers, Toyota and Honda, were still viewed as industry leaders in new product development. Attempts to lower product development costs focused around modular designs and ? “virtual prototyping? ” ? – the use of 3D computer graphics to design and test prototypes. THE INDUSTRY The Manufacturers

The major automobile manufacturers are shown in table 4. 8. The ranks of the leading producers were dominated by US, Japanese, and European companies? —outside of these countries only Hyundai of Korea was among the leading manufacturers. All the major manufacturers are multinational. Thus, both GM and Ford produce more cars outside the US than within it. Similarly, Honda produces more Accords in the US than in Japan As a result some countries ? – notably Canada, Spain and the UK ? – are significant auto producing countries without having any significant domestic auto companies.

Over the past two decades the industry has consolidated through mergers and acquisitions. (see table 4. 9). The financial problems of Japanese and Korean auto companies during the late 1990s accelerated this process. As a result, US and European carmakers had acquires significant proportions of the Japanese and Korean auto industries by 2004. At the same time, a number of small producers continued to survive? — especially in protected markets. Trade liberalization represented a threat to these companies? —it seemed unlikely that many of China? ’s 30-odd motor vehicle manufacturers would survive China? s accession to the World Trade Organization. [Tables 4. 8 and 4. 9 about here] Outsourcing and the Role of Suppliers Henry Ford? ’s system of mass production was supported by heavy backward integration. In Ford? ’s giant River Rouge plant, iron ore entered at one end, Model Ts emerged at the other. Ford even owned rubber plantations in the Amazon basin. The trend of the past 20 years has been towards increasing outsourcing of materials, components, and subassemblies. This has been led primarily by the desire for lower costs and increased flexibility.

Again, leadership came from the Japanese: Toyota and Nissan have traditionally been much more reliant upon their supplier networks than their US or European counterparts. At the end of the 1990? ’s and Ford both spun off their component manufacturing businesses as separate companies: Delphi ad Visteon, respectively. Relationships with suppliers also changed. In contrast to the US model of arm? ’s-length relationships and written contracts, the Japanese manufacturers developed close, collaborative long-run relationships with their ? “first-tier? ” suppliers.

During the 1990s, the Japanese model of close collaboration and extensive technical interchange with a smaller number of leading suppliers became the model for all the world? ’s automakers. all the world? ’s auto manufacturers outsourced more manufacturing and technology development while greatly reducing the number of their suppliers. As the leading component suppliers have gained increasing responsibility for technological development? —especially in sophisticated subassemblies such as transmissions, braking systems, and electrical and electronic equipment? they have also grown in size and global reach. By2004, Bosch, Johnson Controls, Denso, and Delphi were as big as some of the larger automobile companies (see table 4. 10). [Table 4. 10 about here] The Quest for Cost Reduction Increasing competition in the industry has intensified the quest for cost reduction among automobile manufacturers. Cost-reduction measures have included: ? • Worldwide outsourcing. The tendency for increased outsourcing of components has been noted above. In addition, auto firms have developed OEM supply arrangements amongst themselves: Daewoo supplies several of GM? s models, GM supplies components to Fiat, Mitsubishi and Chrysler supplied engines for the BMW Mini,. ?• Just-in-time scheduling radically reduced levels of inventory and work-in-progress. ?• Manufacturing has shifted to lower-cost locations: VW? ’s North American production is based in Mexico and it moved production from Germany to the Czech Republic, Spain, and Hungary; Japanese companies have moved more and more production to lower-cost locations in Southeast Asia; Mercedes and BMW developed greenfield plants in the Deep South of the US. • In high-cost locations (North America, Western Europe, and Japan) increased automation has reduced labor input. Different companies have faced different cost issues. While European manufacturers were constrained by rigid working conditions, restrictions on layoffs, and generous benefits, US companies were hit by increased provisions for pensions and healthcare. In Japan the critical cost issue of the past decade was the strength of the yen. The quest for economies of scale and scope in relation to product development meant that companies sought to spread rising development costs over larger production and sales volumes.

Increasingly during the 1990s the auto manufacturers attempted to introduce single global products. After failing to reach agreement between its European and US designers over a common Escort model, Ford? ’s Mondeo/Contour was the company? ’s first truly global model. This desire for scale economies in development, manufacture, and purchasing also resulted in the standardization of designs and components across the different models of each manufacturer. Ford emphasized the critical importance of: ? “? realizing efficiencies in manufacturing, engineering and product costs for new vehicles by sharing vehicle platforms and components among various models and the re-use of those platforms and components from one generation of a vehicle model to the next.? ”1 During the late 1990s, Ford synchronized platforms with Mazda, and by 2000 was building its luxury models on the same platforms used for its volume models. Thus, the ? ‘Jaguar X-type used the Mondeo platform=, while the Jaguar S-type and the Lincoln LS also shared the same platform. Automotive News explained: “Ford’s platform strategy is evolving out of the company’s desire to cut costs by spreading its technology across as many brands as possible. The idea is to share systems in areas that customers can’t see and feel, and differentiate the brands in areas they can.? ” Similar standardization occurred in engines. Ford moved to just five basic engine designs whose modular structure allowed many common components and multiple variations. Thus, Ford? ’s Global Inline 4-cylinder engine family, launched in 2003 in the Mazda 6, had 100 possible variations, and consolidated eight engine families into one.

Excess Capacity A major problem for the industry was the tendency for the growth of production capacity to outstrip the growth in the demand for cars. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese companies were major investors in new capacity with a number of greenfield ? “transplants? ” in North America and Europe. During the 1990s all the world? ’s major car companies responded to the quest for globalization with new plants (many of them joint ventures) in the growth markets of Southeast Asia, China, India, South America, and Eastern Europe.

During 1992? –7, the Korean car companies were especially aggressive investors in new capacity. It was particularly worrying that, even in the markets were demand was growing fastest (such as China where sales grew by over 50% in 2002 and 2003), growth of production capacity outstripped gowth in demand. KPMG forecast that in 2005, Chinese car sales would be 2. 6 million while production capacity would be 4. 9 million. 2 The resulting overhang of excess capacity was a key factor exacerbating intense competition in the industry..

Table 4. 11 shows trends in capacity utilization. [Table 4. 11 about here] Internationalization The driving force behind capacity expansion was internationalization. Although multinational growth extends back to 1920s, when Ford and General Motors established their European subsidiaries, until the 1970s the world auto industry was made up of fairly separate national markets. Each of the larger national markets was supplied primarily by domestic production, and indigenous manufacturers tended to be market leaders. For example in 1970, he Big Three (GM, Ford, and Chrysler) held close to 85 percent of the US market, VW and Daimler Benz dominated the market in Germany, as did Fiat in Italy, British Leyland (later Rover) in the UK, Seat in Spain, and Renault, Peugeot, and Citroen in France. By 2004, the industry was global in scope? —the world? ’s leading manufacturers were competing in most of the countries of the world. Internationalization required establishing distributors and dealership networks in overseas countries, and often building manufacturing plants.

Foreign direct investment in manufacturing plants had been encouraged by trade restrictions. Restrictions on Japanese automobile imports into the North America and Europe encouraged the Japanese automakers to build plants in these regions. Table 4. 12 shows some of the North American auto plants established by overseas (mainly Japanese) companies. Similarly, the high tariffs protecting the motor vehicle markets of most Asian and Latin American countries obliged the major automakers to set up local assembly. [Table 4. 2 about here] Different companies has pursued different internationalization strategies: Toyota and Honda had expanded throughout the world by establishing whollyowned greenfield plants. Ford, which had initially internationalized by creating wholly-owned subsidiaries throughout the world, extended its global reach during 1987-1999 by acquiring Mazda, Jaguar, Aston Martin, Land Rover, and Volvo. GM extended its global reach through a series of alliances and minority equity stakes. notably with Fiat, Suzuki, Saab, and Daewoo.

DaimlerChrysler was created through a transatlantic merger in 1987, established a position in Asia by acquiring equity in Mitsubishi Motors and Hyundai. Volkswagen made a series of acquisitions in Europe (Seat, Skoda, and Rolls Royce) and had focuses heavily on investing in manufacturing capacity outside the advanced industrial countries? —notably in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and China. Although the logic of maximizing volume in order to spread the costs of developing new models and new technologies, pushed companies into expanding into all three of world? ’s major markets? North America, Europe, and Asia (Japan in particular)? —many sizable companies remained regional players. Renault had effectively merged with Nissan and Samsung Motors, but lacked any presence in North America, while Fiat and Peugeot were essentially European manufacturers. Despite the tremendous internationalization of the auto industry, for every company, its home market remained its most important market where it typically exercised market leadership. For example, Fiat was market leader in Italy, VW in Germany, Renault and PSA in France, Hyundai and Daewoo in Korea (see table 4. 13).

This was partly a legacy of earlier import protection, partly due to national preferences of domestic consumers, and partly a result of well-developed local dealership networks and intimate local knowledge. [Table 4. 13 about here] Industry Location Given the shift demand to the emerging market countries and the auto makers? ’ quest for lower production costs, it might be expected that the geographical distribution of the industry would have changed substantially over recent decades (in the same way that other manufacturing industries ? – consumer electronics, small appliances, textiles, and semiconductors ? have relocated in newly industrializing countries). Yet, in automobiles, such shifts have been surprisingly small. The main feature of 1950? –80 was the rise of production in Japan, but since 1980, changes have been small, with the three major manufacturing regions ? – Western Europe, North America, and Japan ? – each accounting for close to 30 percent of world production. The continuing dominance of this triad is despite the attempts of newly industrializing countries to develop their domestic industries, either by protecting domestic manufacturers or by encouraging inward investment. (Tables 4. 4 and 4. 15 show production by different regions and countries in recent years. ) The advantages of these countries lie primarily in labor costs, which were often a fraction of those in the older industrialized countries (see table 4. 16). Nevertheless, with the exception of Korea, none of the new auto-manufacturing countries has emerged as a major world center for motor vehicle production. The ability of the established auto-manufacturing countries to sustain their leadership points to the importance of factors other than wage rates in driving international competitiveness in the auto industry.

Table 4. 17 shows that, although wage costs were much lower in Mexico than in the US, this cost advantage was outweighed by other factors. [Tables 4. 14, 4. 15, 4. 16, and 4. 17 about here] Market Segments and Market Positioning Despite the globalization of the leading automakers, the world market in 2004 was still composed of many national markets due to differences in national regulations and customer preferences, differences in affluence and infrastructure, and trade restrictions, and the need for each manufacturer to build a dealership network in each market it served.

The world market was also segmented by types of product. The market passenger cars was traditionally segmented by size of automobile. . At the top end of the market were ? “luxury cars? ” distinguished primarily by their price. There were also specific types of vehicle: sports cars, sport-utility vehicles, small passenger vans (? “minivans? ”), and pickup trucks. Although industry statistics distinguish between automobiles and trucks? —the latter being for commercial use, in practice, the distinction was less clear.

In the US small pickup trucks were a popular alternative to automobiles; sport utility vehicles were also classed as trucks. Margins varied considerably between product segments. Chrysler? ’s position as one of the world? ’s most profitable auto manufacturers during for much of the 1990s was primarily a result of its strong position in SUVs (through Jeep) and minivans (through its Dodge Caravan and Plymouth Voyager models). The luxury car segment too was traditionally associated with high margins.

By contrast, small and medium sized family cars have typically lost money. However, mobility barriers between segments tend to be low. Modular product designs and common platforms and components have facilitated the entry of the major manufacturers into specialty segments. As the pressure of competition has increased across all market segments, manufacturers have sought differentiation advantage through introducing models that combine design features from different segments. During 2000-03, an increasing number of ? “crossover? vehicles were introduced into the US market. Notably, SUVs that adopted the integrated body and frame of the typical automobile, such as the BMW X5, Honda Pilot, ad Saturn Vue; minivan-SUV hybrids such as the Chrysler Pacifica and Pontiac Aztec; sport-utility station wagons such as the Cadillac SRX four-wheel drive minivans, luxury SUVs, and smaller SUVs based on small-car platforms such as the Honda CR-X and Toyota RAV4. Vertical segmentation was also an issue for the industry. Profitability varied across the different stages of the auto industry? s value chain. The prevailing wisdom was that downstream activities offered better profit potential than manufacturing activities? —certainly financial services (mainly customer and dealer credit) were far more profitable than vehicle manufacturing. . It was this logic that had encouraged the auto companies to outsource and spin off most of their production of components and motivated Ford? ’s previous CEO, Jacques Nasser, to acquire downstream companies such as the repair and parts supplier Kwik Fit and Hertz car rental. THE OUTLOOK

In February 2004, Bruce Blythe reviewed the presentation that Ford Treasurer, Malcolm MacDonald, would be making on the roadshow that would take him to London, Singapore, and Tokyo. The milestones set for the current year, which predicted pretax profits in automotive operations to reach $0. 9-$1. 1 billion on volumes that would be similar to 2003, looked achievable, especially given the robust state of the US economy in terms of GDP growth. His concerns related to the longer term. The roadshow presentation forecast that Ford? ’s pretax profit would reach $7 billion by ? the middle of the decade.? ” Certainly Ford was determined to maintaining its cost cutting momentum. However, cost cutting alone was unlikely to restore return on capital in Ford? ’s automotive operations to the kind of profitability necessary to justify the planned investments in new models, new technologies, and upgrading of manufacturing operations. Ford? ’s ability of ? ‘ford to earn a satisfactory margin on its cars would depend critically upon a more favorable industry environment than that which had existed for the past three years.

With the world economy still sluggish and dependent primarily on the continuing consumer boom in the US and sustainability of China? ’s booming industrial production, it was not apparent that the excess capacity that had plagued the industry in recent years would be eliminated any time soon. One of the things that Blythe had learned from his years with Ford of Europe was that, even when faced with vast overcapacity, closing car plants was not easy. The presence of powerful unuons was one problem, the other was the desre for national governments to provide subisies to keep uneconomic plants in business in ordr to avoid localized unemployed.

The most hopeful current trend was the increasing concentration tht had resulted form mergers and acquisitions. The ability of the industry to control excess capacity and avoid aggressive price competition (including generous discounts and credit terms) depended critically upon continued consolidation arounfd a dominant group of global producers. The spate of mergers and acquisitions had reduced the number of independent automobile manufacturers producing over 400,000 units a year from 23 in 1995 to 13 in 2002.

Most industry experts believed that this consolidation would continue: as early as 1999 Business Week had forecast that only manufacturers with annual production of five million vehicles or over would survive, leading to the emergence of a global ? “Big Six? ”: GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, VW, and Honda. 3 Others disagreed; Peugeot and BMW were adamant that the benefits of huge volume and broad scope were offset by advantages of flexibility, innovation, and brand strength that placed medium-sized players at a competitive advantage to lumbering giants such as GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler.

Looking longer term, there was disagreement over whether the industry would mature through steady, gradual evolution, or would be subject to more radical change. The auto makers had adapted to electronics, new materials, and other technological changes without any major impact on basic automotive design. The prospects for more radical technological change were linked closely with environmental issues. Fears for the demise of the internal combustion engine had proved groundless and most of the investments by the companies in electrical propulsion had been viewed as wasted money.

Yet, the threat of global warming was growing, and in several cities of the world problems of pollution were already encouraging government measures to substitute electrical propulsion for gasoline propulsion. Important developments were also occurring within the value chain. The transfer of manufacturing and technology development from the auto producers to component suppliers seemed likely to continue. Many manufacturers seemed to be unconcerned about losing control over production and technology so long as they could control marketing and distribution.

But here too some disturbing developments were occurring. The auto companies control over their distribution networks was threatened by the emergence of new automobile ? “megastores? ” (such as Auto Nation and CarMax ) and the growth of internet sales. As Business Week observed, ? “Retailers have historically been the apparatus auto makers use to find homes for all the new cars they crank out. Powerful new buyers could be a threat, the relationship could change to one where the retailer tells the auto maker what to do and what price to sell at.? 4 Changes in the industry? ’s structure over time would influence not just the overall intensity of competition and the prospects of industry profitability, but also how that profit was shared among the different companies. As the companies had converged in terms of technology, design and even quality levels, so cost had emerged as the critical success factor. This in turn had created the drive to exploit economies of scale and scope.

Now that all manufacturers were following similar strategies to exploit economies of scale and scope through common vehicle platforms, common components, global models, and global sourcing, what factors would emerge as the critical determinants of competitive advantage during the remainder of the decade? APPENDIX The World? ’s Major Automobile Producers, Sales and Profitability 1980? –2003 Notes 1. Ford Motor Company, 10K Report, 2003. 2. ?“Survey of China,? ” Economist (March 20, 2004): 6. 3. ?“Autos: The Global Six,? ” Business Week (January 25, 1999). 4.

Business Week, February 24, 1997, p. 89. Copyright © 2002, Robert M. Grant Table 4. 1 Economic Value Added of major automobile producers during the 1990s (in $, millions) 1991-95 General Motors Ford Toyota VW Fiat Renault Peugeot Hyundai Suzuki BMW (34,684) (28,654) (15,374) (10,322) (7,713) n. a. n. a. n. a. (774) (2,648) 1996-99 (25,241) (327)DailmerChrysler (6,744) (5,192)Nissan (21,353) (5,418 (8,209) (1,197) (971) (369 (2,220) 340 8,828 (9,525) Honda (5,477) 637 Source: ? “Economic value added of major automobile producers,? ” Best of Times, Worst of Times, Stern Stewart & Co. December 2000. Table 4. 2 US motor vehicle production Passenger cars 1900 1905 4,192 24,250 Trucks and buses n. a. 750 Total 4,192 25,000 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1967 1970 1975 1977 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 181,000 895,930 1,905,560 3,735,171 2,787,456 3,273,874 3,717,385 69,532 6,665,863 7,920,186 6,674,796 9,305,561 7,436,764 6,546,817 6,712,852 9,200,849 6,400,026 8,002,259 6,049,749 5,407,120 5,684,221 5,981,046 6,601,223 6,350,367 6,083,000 5,927,000 5,554,390 5,637,949 5,542,217 ,000 74,000 321,789 530,659 575,364 697,367 754,901 655,683 1,337,193 1,249,105 1,194,475 1,751,805 1,539,462 1,692,442 2,272,160 3,411,521 1,667,283 3,464,327 3,718,781 3,375,422 4,042,486 4,883,157 5,648,767 5,634,742 5,749,000 6,169,000 6,451,689 7,387,029 7,228,497 187,000 969,930 2,227,349 4,265,830 3,362,820 3,971,241 4,472,286 725,215 8,003,056 9,169,291 7,869,271 11,057,366 8,976,226 8,239,259 8,985,012 12,612,370 8,067,309 11,466,586 9,768,530 8,782,542 9,726,707 10,864,203 12,249,990 11,985,109 11,832,000 12,096,000 12,006,079 13,024,978 12,770,714 001 2002 4,879,119 5,016,306 6,545,570 7,258,611 11,424,689 12,274,917 Source: Based on Ward? ’s Automotive Yearbooks Table 4. 3 Average age of passenger cars in the US (years) Mean 2002 2000 1998 1996 1994 1992 1990 1988 1984 1980 1976 1972 1968 1962 1958 1952 1948 1941 Source: R. L. Polk & Co. 8. 8 8. 8 8. 7 8. 5 8. 4 8. 1 7. 8 7. 6 7. 5 6. 6 6. 2 5. 7 5. 6 6. 0 5. 6 6. 8 8. 8 5. 5 Median 8. 4 8. 3 8. 1 7. 4 7. 4 7. 0 6. 5 6. 8 6. 7 6. 0 5. 5 5. 1 4. 7 5. 7 5. 1 4. 5 8. 0 4. 9 Table 4. 4 World motor vehicle production (passenger cars and commercial ehicles) Total (mil. ) US and Canada as % of total 79. 4 70. 9 50. 4 49. 4 32. 1 31. 4 24. 8 30. 3 29. 1 27. 4 27. 3 26. 2 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total (mil. ) US and Canada as % of total 24. 2 23. 0 24. 5 28. 3 29. 4 28. 8 28. 2 28. 0 27. 3 28. 7 27. 4 24. 8 25. 3 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 10. 58 13. 63 16. 49 24. 27 29. 40 33. 00 38. 51 44. 81 45. 30 45. 90 48. 21 49. 10 48. 35 46. 50 47. 69 46. 40 49. 69 49. 93 52. 50 54. 15 53. 50 55. 4 57. 43 56. 33 58. 31 Sources: OICA, American Automobile Manufacturers Association Table 4. 5 Weight of material in a typical family automobile 1978 Steel Iron Plastic and plastic composites Aluminum Copper and brass Zinc castings Glass Rubber Other Total Source: American Metal market Table 4. 6 From option to standard: convergence in automobile features Feature Speedometer Automatic transmission Introduction 1901 by Oldsmobile First installed 1904 General adoption Circa 1915 Introduced by Packard as an option 1938.

Standard on Cadillacs and other luxury cars early 1950s Standard equipment by 1916 Becomes standard early 1920s Becomes standard late 1920s Standard equipment 1946 Only limited availability by 1994 Become standard 1939 Standard feature in Fords 1938 Standard equipment by 1969 Standard on GM cars in 1991 Standard in most new cars by 1994 (pounds) 2,128 512 180 112 37 31 86 146 337 3,569 2003 (pounds) 1, 814 328 255 279 50 8 99 149 377 3,359 Electric headlamps All-steel body Steel enclosed body Radio Four-wheel drive Hydraulic brakes Shatterproof glass Power steering Anti-lock brakes Air bags

GM introduced 1908 Adopted by GM 1912 Dodge 1923 Optional extra 1923 Appeared 1924 Introduced 1924 First used in cars 1927 Introduced 1952 Introduced 1972 Introduced by GM 1974 Source: Various reportst. Table 4. 7 New car development costs during the 1990s Ford Mondeo/Contour GM Saturn Ford Taurus (1996 model) Ford Escort (new model) Chrysler Neon Renault Clio (1999 model) Honda Accord (1997 model) $6 billion $5 billion $2. 8 billion $2 billion $1. 3 billion $1. 3 billion $0. 6 billion BMW Mini Rolls Royce Phantom (2003 model) $0. 5 billion $0. 3 billion Source: Assembled from various newspaper reports. Table 4. The world? ’s leading auto manufacturers Production (? ’000s of autos and commercial vehicles) 1992 GM Ford Toyota DaimlerChrysler Volkswagen Peugeot Honda Nissan Hyundai Renault Fiat Mitsubishi Suzuki BMW Mazda AutoVAZ Fuji Daihatsu Kia Isuzu Daewoo Volvo Rover US US Japan Germany Germany France Japan Japan S. Korea France Italy Japan Japan Germany Japan Russia Japan Japan S. Korea Japan S. Korea Sweden UK 6,764 5,742 4,249 1994 8,254 6,679 4,565 1996 8,176 6,611 4,794 1998 8,155 6,850 4,643 2000 8,114 7,206 5,897 4,666 5,106 2,879 2,469 2,698 2,488 2,515 2,639 1,613 1,434 835 972 756 581 -735 572 834 n. . 345 2002 8,326 6,729 6,626 4,456 5,017 3,262 2,988 2,719 2,642 2,329 2,191 1,821 1,704 1,091 1,044 703 542 –437 407 161 147 2,782 3,286 2,437 1,762 2,963 874 1,929 1,800 1,599 888 598 1,248 674 648 610 502 473 179 365 405 2,764 2,436 2,027 1,725 2,702 1,153 1,881 1,967 1,504 1,076 573 1,215 528 434 554 675 487 419 439 485 4,082 3,977 1,975 2,021 2,712 1,402 1,755 2,545 1,452 1,387 641 984 562 525 691 847 462 710 446 510 4,562 3,320 1,294 2,298 2,610 889 2,234 2,341 1,353 1,450 706 1. 030 n. a n. a. 724 498 461 758 487 502 Volkswagen? ’s production for 1996 and 1997 includes Skoda and Seat.

Sources: Ward? ’s Automotive Yearbook, Fortune. Table 4. 9 Mergers and acquisitions among automobile manufacturers, 1986? –2001 2002 GM (US) Daewoo (S. Korea) 42% of equity acquired 2000 2000 2000 2000 1999 1999 1999 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1997 1997 1996 1996 1995 1995 1994 1991 1990 1990 1987 1987 1986 Renault (France) GM (US) DaimlerChrysler (Germ. ) DaimlerChrysler (Germ. ) Renault (France) Ford (US) Ford (US) Daimler Benz (Germany) VW (Germany) Hyundai (S. Korea) Daewoo (S. Korea) Daewoo (S. Korea) Proton (Malaysia) BMW (Germany) Daewoo (S. Korea) Daewoo (S.

Korea) Fiat (Italy) Ford (US) Daewoo (S. Korea) VW (Germany) GM (US) Ford (US) Ford (US) Chrysler (US) VW (Germany) Samsung Motors (S. Korea) Fiat (Italy) Hyundai (S. Korea) Mitsubishi Motors ( Japan) Nissan ( Japan) Volvo (Sweden) Land Rover (UK) Chrysler (US) Rolls Royce Motors (UK) Kia (S. Korea) Sssangyong Motor (S. Korea) Samsung Motor (S. Korea) Lotus (UK) Rover (UK) FSO (Poland) FS Lublin (Poland) FSM (Poland) Mazda ( Japan) Oltcit/Rodae (Romania) Skoda (Czech Republic) Saab-Scandia (Sweden) Jaguar (UK) Aston Martin (UK) Lamborghini (Italy) Seat (Spain) 0% of equity acquired 20% of equity acquired 10% of equity acquired 34% of equity acquired 38. 6% of equity acquired Car business acquired from Volvo Acquired from BMW 50% of equity acquired Table 4. 10 Revenues and profitability of the biggest automotive component suppliers Revenues($ billion) 1994 1996 1998 17. 8 ? — 7. 1 11. 7 ? — 9. 0 ? — 6. 5 5. 7 12. 5 6. 6 2000 29. 1 29. 1 6. 3 18. 2 19. 5 14. 1 10. 5 8. 9 8. 9 12. 7 8. 3 2003 36. 7 28. 1 12. 6 19. 5 17. 7 15. 7 15. 3 11. 7 11. 6 10. 1 8. 1 ROE 2003 (%) 7 (4) 17. 2 8 (65) 17 12 7 13. 11 12 Robert Bosch (Germany) 19. 6 16. 3 Delphi Automotive ? — ? Johnson Controls (US) Denso Corp. (Japan) Visteon (US) Lear Corp (US) Magna International (Canada) Aisin Seiki (Japan) Valeo SA (France) Dana (US) Eaton (US) 11. 0 ? — 3. 1 ? — 7. 3 3. 8 5. 5 4. 4 13. 9 ? — 6. 2 ? — 7. 8 5. 0 7. 7 7. 0 22. 6 16 Sources: Business Week ? “Global 1000? ”; Hoovers Online. Table 4. 11 Capacity utilization in motor vehicle manufacturing (%) 2002 United States 80. 4 2000 83. 7 1998 79. 6 1996 78. 8 1994 85. 3 1992 1990 71. 29 66. 4 Western Europe Asia 73. 8 70. 3 71. 8 64. 5 71. 5 61. 2 72. 0 68. 5 69. 8 69. 8 75. 8 77. 8 75. 1 76. 7 Sources: Federal Reserve Board, The Economist, economagic. om. Table 4. 12 Japanese and European ? “transplants? ” in North America Company Honda of America Toyota USA NUMMI, CAMI Automotive Toyota Canada Honda of Canada Diamond-Star Motors Subaru-Isuzu Auto Nissan Motor USA BMW AutoAlliance International Volkswagen Parent(s) Honda Toyota Toyota & GM Suzuki and GM Toyota Honda Mitsubishi/Chrysler Fuji and Isuzu Nissan BMW Mazda/Ford Volkswagen Location E. Liberty and Marysville, OH Georgetown, KY Fremont, CA Ontario Ontario Ontario Normal, IL Lafayette, IN Sryrna, TN Spartanburg, NC Flat Rock, MI Puebla, Mexico Production of cars and lt. rucks 2002 641,109 667,648 205,306 62,746 218,010 391,100 202,352 97,643 409,673 163,188 47,603 332,876 Source: Ward? ’s Automotive Yearbook Table 4. 13 Automobile market shares in individual countries (%) 2002 Japan Toyota Honda Nissan Suzuki Mitsubishi Mazda Korea* Hyundai Kia Daewoo Australia GM-Holden Toyota Ford Mitsubishi Hyundai France Renault Peugeot VW Ford Italy Fiat VW Ford Peugeot 29. 8 18. 8 12. 2 10. 3 5. 8 4. 9 52. 0 18. 7 11. 9 26. 3 16. 9 13. 5 8. 5 5. 6 27. 0 33. 6 10. 7 5. 5 30. 3 12. 4 9. 3 9. 9 2000 28. 5 16. 2 11. 8 10. 0 6. 9 6. 0 50. 3 19. 7 24. 8 22. 16. 8 15. 9 9. 6 8. 1 28. 2 30. 9 11. 2 6. 2 35. 5 11. 8 8. 8 7. 6 1997 30. 6 10. 1 14. 0 8. 6 7. 9 4. 3 46. 6 23. 0 30. 2 17. 7 13. 4 19. 6 11. 9 11. 1 27. 4 28. 8 11. 4 8. 0 43. 0 9. 9 9. 3 6. 3 1994 33. 7 8. 5 18. 0 n. a. 9. 2 6. 3 46. 5 26. 5 16. 0 21. 3 19. 0 24. 4 10. 1 8. 9. 30. 0 31. 1 8. 0 8. 1 46. 0 10. 4 9. 6 n. a. 1988 43. 9 10. 8 23. 2 n. a. 4. 9 6. 7 55. 9 25. 0 19. 1 20. 9 15. 3 28. 1 12. 2 n. a. 29. 1 34. 2 9. 2 7. 1 59. 9 11. 7 3. 7 . n. a. Renault UK Ford GM Peugeot VW BMW/Rover Germany VW/Audi GM Ford Mercedes Japanese US GM Ford DaimlerChrysler Toyota Honda . 9 15. 6 13. 0 13. 2 12. 1 8. 6 26. 0 10. 4 8. 1 11. 9 10. 6 25. 5 16. 4 8. 6 12. 2 10. 3 7. 0 20. 7 14. 2 12. 3 11. 1 7. 7 27. 8 12. 5 7. 6 12. 8 10. 8 28. 6 19. 1 10. 5 11. 0 10. 0 6. 8 18. 7 14. 3 11. 4 7. 9 12. 9 25. 0 15. 6 11. 0 8. 5 12. 3 325 20. 8 9. 9 10. 0 7. 0 22. 2 16. 9 12. 1 n. a. 12. 8 20. 9 16. 5 9. 9 8. 2 12. 5 34. 3 22. 6 8. 5 8. 5 7. 1 26. 3 13. 7 8. 7 . n. a. 15. 0 28. 3 16. 1 10. 1 9. 2 15. 2 *Domestic producers only (excludes imports). Source: Ward? ’s Automotive Yearbook 2001 and earlier years. Table 4. 4 World motor vehicle production by countries and regions (% of world total) 1960 United States Western Europe Centraland E. Europe Japan Korea Other Total units (millions) 52. 0 38. 0 2. 0 1. 0 ? — 7. 0 12. 8 1989 23. 8 31. 7 4. 8 18. 2 1. 8 19. 7 49. 5 1992 20. 6 32. 5 ? — 26. 7 3. 7 16. 4 47. 5 1994 24. 5 31. 2 4. 3 21. 2 4. 6 14. 4 50. 0 1997 22. 0 32. 6 5. 6 20. 5 4. 8 14. 5 55. 0 1998 23. 0 32. 6 4. 3 19. 2 3. 4 17. 5 53. 3 2000 2002 22. 2 20. 9 29. 9 28. 8 4. 6 4. 4 17. 7 17. 4 5. 0 5. 3 20. 6 23. 2 57. 4 58. 8 Products for E. Europe and USSR included in ? Other? ” for 1991 and 1992. Sources: AAMA, Automotive News. Table 4. 15 Automobile production by country (thousands of cars) 2002 US Canada Mexico Total N. America Germany France Italy UK Spain Sweden Total W. Europe Japan Korea Australia 5,016 1,396 961 7,373 5,123 3,284 1,126 1,628 2,267 238 14,435 8,619 2,651 307 2000 5,542 1,551 1,130 8,223 5,132 2,883 1,442 1,641 2,445 260 14,853 8,363 1,881 324 1998 5,554 1,481 958 7,993 5,348 2,582 1,378 1,748 2,216 368 14,790 8,055 1,434 349 1997 5,884 1,374 833 8,091 4,678 3,326 1,580 1,868 1,961 373 14,687 8,494 2,088 323 995 6,338 1,339 710 8,387 4,360 3,051 1,422 1,532 1,959 390 14,350 7,664 1,893 284 1994 6,601 1,215 840 8,657 4,040 3,175 1,341 1,467 1,822 353 13,844 7,801 1,805 286 1992 5,664 1,020 778 7,463 4,864 3,320 1,477 1,292 1,799 294 13,520 9,379 1,307 270 1990 1987 6,077 7,099 1,072 810 346 266 7,496 8,176 4,805 4,604 3,295 3,052 1,874 1,701 1,296 1,143 1,679 1,403 336 432 13,672 13,471 9,948 7,891 987 793 361 225 China India Taiwan Former USSR Poland Brazil 1,091 706 245 981 287 1,521 620 541 265 967 533 1,348 543 406 285 836 574 1,223 543 380 258 1,066 426 1,680 356 n. a. 271 834 260 1,312 13 208 n. a. n. a. n. a. 263 283 798 1,050 250 1,249 212 816 n. a. n. a. n. a. 277 175 1,260 1,329 256 663 301 789 Sources: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, Korean Automobile Manufacturers Association, Marketing Systems. Table 4. 16 Hourly compensation for motor vehicle workers (US$ per hour including benefits) 1975 US Mexico Japan Korea Taiwan France Germany Italy Spain UK 9. 55 2. 94 3. 56 0. 45 0. 64 5. 10 7. 89 5. 16 ? — 4. 12 1981 17. 03 5. 27 7. 61 1. 33 1. 86 9. 11 3. 34 8. 21 7. 03 8. 10 1984 19. 02 2. 55 7. 90 1. 74 2. 09 8. 20 11. 92 8. 00 5. 35 7. 44 1986 20. 09 2. 3 11. 80 1. 84 2. 23 11. 06 16. 96 11. 03 7. 74 9. 22 22. 48 2. 79 15. 77 5. 78 5. 72 15. 94 27. 58 17. 97 15. 00 13. 87 1990 26. 56 4. 05 26. 36 8. 83 6. 76 17. 66 36. 10 16. 74 15. 17 15. 07 1994 27. 49 2. 94 23. 38 7. 75 6. 68 19. 32 36. 70 18. 56 14. 72 19. 63 1998 2002 7 29. 15 5. 44 25. 88 10. 85 7. 00 17. 25 31. 41 15. 02 13. 68 19. 40 Source: US Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Table 4. 17 The cost of producing a compact automobile, US and Mexico, 1992 ($) US Parts and components Labor Shipping costs Inventory Total 7,750 700 300 20 8,770 Mexico 8,000 140 1,000 40 9,180

Source: US Office of Technology Assessment, October 1992. Table 4. A1 Sales ($ billion) 2003 GM Ford DaimlerChrysler Chrysler Daimler Benz Toyota VW Honda Fiat Nissan Peugeot Renault BMW Mitsubishi Hyundai Motor 186 164 172 ? — ? — 129 109 67 61 57 68 47 52 32 21 2002 187 163 157 ? — ? — 107 91 55 55 47 57 38 44 24 40 2001 177 162 136 ? — ? — 106 78 52 58 49 46 32 34 26 30 2000 185 170 152 61 70 121 79 58 53 55 41 37 33 30 29 1999 167 163 151 61 72 120 70 57 45 61 38 35 33 32 21 1998 161 144 142 53 72 113 60 60 56 54 39 43 35 27 15 1997 178 154 ? 39 59 84 64 43 51 47 31 35 34 n. a n. a. 1996 168 147 ? — 28 34 109 67 47 51 59 34 36 35 33 n. a. 1995 169 137 ? — 13 12 111 61 44 46 63 33 37 32 37 n. a. 1990-94 1985? –9 128 96 ? — 110 77 ? — 1980? –4 68 42 ? — ?— 82 48 35 42 51 28 31 21 25 n. a. 42 28 18 27 26 19 31 10 14 n. a. 18 16 8 18 16 13 15 5 12 n. a. Mazda 20 16 16 16 20 17 15 17 19 21 12 n. a. Table 4. A2 Return on Equity (%) 2003 GM Ford DaimlerChrysler Chrysler Daimler Benz Toyota VW Honda Fiat Nissan Peugeot Renault BMW Mitsubishi Hyundai Motor Mazda 15. 1 4. 2 1. 3 ? — ? — 10. 5 4. 4 16. (51. 3) 27. 2 12. 1 17. 6 11. 8 12. 5 n. a. 12. 0 2002 25. 6 (17. 5) 13. 5 ? — ? — 7. 7 ? — 14. 0 (3. 7) 23. 0 14. 6 16. 4 14. 5 3. 9 10. 7 4. 9 2001 3. 0 (70. 0) (1. 7) ? — ? — 9. 5 10. 5 10. 6 5. 0 36. 4 15. 3 10. 1 17. 3 n. a. 10. 0 (93. 2) 2000 14. 8 18. 6 18. 3 ? — ? — 7. 5 12. 1 11. 8 4. 9 39. 2 13. 8 11. 0 20. 6 (123. 2) 8. 9 (110. 7) 1999 29. 9 26. 3 15. 9 ? — ? — 6. 5 18. 0 14. 9 3. 4 (3. 8) 9. 5 6. 5 11. 3 (26. 8) 7. 7 11. 6 1998 19. 7 94. 3 15. 9 ? — ? — 6. 8 13. 2 17. 3 4. 8 (2. 2) 5. 7 17. 0 (63. 2) 0. 2 1. 0 10. 9 1997 37. 1 22. 9 ? — 24. 12. 0 8. 0 6. 2 18. 8 10. 6 (8. 0) (4. 7) 12. 6 14. 1 n. a. n. a. (1. 0) 1996 21. 2 16. 6 ? — 30. 5 10. 5 7. 5 14. 6 17. 5 9. 7 6. 3 1. 3 14. 2 9. 4 2. 6 n. a. 5. 6 1995 29. 5 16. 9 ? — 18. 5 43. 8 5. 4 5. 9 6. 8 9. 7 7. 2 3. 1 4. 8 8. 5 2. 9 n. a. 4. 3 1990-94 1985? –9 3. 2 5. 9 ? — 2. 0 6. 9 6. 1 3. 4 5. 3 6. 8 3. 6 12. 5 9. 1 9. 7 4. 8 n. a.. 5. 0 11. 8 21. 8 ? — 20. 8 18. 3 10. 6 (0. 4) 11. 8 18. 7 4. 68 36. 7 51. 1 10. 4 7. 9 n. a. 4. 8 1980? –4 11. 4 0. 4 ? — 66. 5 24. 3 12. 6 6. 3 18. 1 10. 9 10. 3 (15. 2) (152. 4) 14. 8 10. 0 n. a. n. a. 1. 6

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